Abstract-In 2008, Barbosa and Farshim introduced the notion of certificateless signcryption (eLSC) and proposed the first eLse scheme [2], but which requires six pairing operations in the signcrypt and unsigncrypt phases. In this paper, aimed at designing an efficient eLSe scheme, we propose a new efficient eLSe scheme from bilinear maps, which requires only two pairing operations in the sign crypt and un sign crypt phases and is more efficient than all the schemes available.
I. INTRODUCTION
Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) was in troduced by AI-Riyami and Paterson [1] as an intermediate be tween traditional public key cryptography (PKC) and identity based cryptography (ID-PKC) [17] . It eliminates the use of certificates as in the traditional PKC and solve the key escrow problem that is inherent in ID-PKC. The main idea of CL PKC is that the Key Generation Center (KGC) is involved to issue a partial private key for a user and the user independently generates his public/private key pair use the partial private key and a secret value chosen by himself.
In 2008, Barbosa and Farshim introduced the notion of certificateless signcryption (CLSC) and proposed the first CLSC scheme [2] , which requires six pairing operations in the signcrypt and unsigncrypt phases. And aimed at designing an efficient CLSC scheme, Wu and Chen proposed a new CLSC scheme [19] , which requires four pairing operations in the signcrypt and unsigncrypt phases, but unfortunately it was found insecure by Sharmila et al. [16] . We note that in pairing based cryptosystems, although numerous papers discuss the complexity of pairings and how to speed up the pairing computation [4, 8, 13] , the computation of the pairing still remains time-consuming.
Our Contribution. It is fair to say that devising an efficient certificateless signcryption still remains an important prob lem. In this paper, motivated by identity-based signcryption scheme proposed in [5] and certificateless public key encryp tion scheme [12] , we present a new efficient certificateless pairing-based signcryption scheme, which requires only two pairing operations in the sign crypt and unsigncrypt phases. Observations [18] pinpointed problems arising when many provably secure pairing based protocols are implemented using Wenjian Xie is with the College of Mathematics and Computer Sci ence, Guangxi University for Nationalities, Nanning, China, email: wjx ieem@gmail.com Zhang Zhang is with the College of Mathematics and Computer Science, Guangxi University for Nationalities, Nanning, China, email: zzhang74@yahoo.com.cn 978-1-4244-5849-3/10/$26.00 ©2010 IEEE asymmetric pairings and ordinary curves. Our proposal avoids those problems thanks to the fact that it does not require to hash onto an elliptic curve cyclic subgroup.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In next Section, we describe some preliminaries, including bilinear map groups and our complexity assumptions. We describe its security models in Section III and propose our new efficient CLSC scheme in Section IV . In Section V, we present its security and efficiency analysis. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Bilinear Map Groups
Let k be a security parameter and p be a k-bit prime number. 
The D L assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the advantage Adv:iLP is negligible. The CDH assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the advantage Adv� D HP is negligible.
Definition 3. The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem (q-SDHP) [10] in the groups (G1, ( 2 ) consists of, given a (q + 2)-tuple (P, Q, aQ, a 2 Q, ... , aqQ)E G1 x G� + 1 for unknown a E Z;, finding a pair (e, o: � cP) with e E Z;.
The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A in solving the q-SDH P in (G1, ( 2 ) is defined as
The q-SDH assumption is that, for any probabilistic polyno mial time algorithm A, the advantage Adv;;. S D HP is negligi ble.
Definition 4. The q-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion Problem (q-BDHIP) [9] in the groups (G1, G 2 , G1f) consists of, given a (q + 2)-tuple (P, Q, aQ, a 2 Q, ... ,aqQ)E G1 x G�+ l for unknown a E Z;, computing e(P, Q) l /O: E GT.
The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algo
.
The q-BDHI assumption is that, for any probabilistic loly nomial time algorithm A, the advantage Adv;;. B D H P is negligible.
III. SECURITY MODEL FOR SIGNCRYPTION
In [2] , Barbosa and Farshim defined the formal security notions for certificateless signcryption schemes. These notions are natural adaptations from the security notions of identity based signcryption [11] by considering two different type ad versaries, a Type I adversary AI and a Type II adversary AI I, and include the indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and the existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks. The adversary AI represents a normal third party attacker against the CLSC scheme. That is, AI is not allowed to access to the master-key but AI may requests public key and replaces public keys with values of its choice. The adversary AI I represents a malicious KGC who generates partial private key of users. The adversary AI I is allowed to have access to the master-key but not replace a public key. Note that, as in [2, 11] , we do not consider attacks targeting ciphertext where the sender and receiver identities are the same. In particular we disallow such queries to relevant oracles and do not accept this type of ciphertext as a valid forgery.
A. Confidentiality Model for Certificateless Signcryption
The confidentiality property (indistinguishability of encryp tions under adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2)) required for certificateless signcryption is captured by the following two games against AI and AI I.
Game IND-CCA2-1. This is the first game where challenger C interacts with adversary AI as follows:
Initialization: C runs the algorithm Setup on input a security parameter k, and obtains master-key and params, and sends params to AI.
Find stage: The adversary AI performs a polynomially bounded number of queries. These queries may be made adaptively, i.e. each query may depend on the answers to the previous queries.
Partial Private Key Extraction: On input of an identity ID, C returns the corresponding partial private key dID.
Public Key Extraction: On input of an identity ID, C returns the corresponding public key pkID.
Private Key Extraction: For any I D, C computes the corresponding private key SkID and sends it to AI. Here, AI is not allowed to query this oracle on any identity for which the corresponding public key has been replaced. This assumption due to the fact that in the real world, AI may be able to gain IDs's some valid ciphertext from eavesdropping or the intended receivers, but those ciphertext are generated by IDs using his own secret value and partial private key. And we disallow queries where IDs = I DJR.
Unsigncrypt Queries: On input of a sender's identity IDs, a receiver's identity IDJR and a ciphertext (J, C sends the result of Unsigncrypt(IDs, pklD" SkiD", (J) to AI. Note that, it is possible that the public key pkIDIR has been replaced earlier by AI. In this case, we assume that AI additionally submits the corresponding secret value to C. Again, we disallow queries where IDs = I DJR.
Challenge: At the end of Find stage, AI returns two distinct messages ma and m1 (assumed of equal length), a sender identity I D § and a receiver identity I D�, on which it wishes to be challenged. The adversary must have made no partial private key extraction and private key extraction on I D�. C picks randomly a bit {3 E {O, I}, computes (J*=Signcrypt(skID � ' ID�, pklD � ' mfJ) and returns it to AI.
Guess stage: AI asks a polynomial number of queries adaptively again as in the Find stage. It is not allowed to extract the partial private key and private key corresponding to I D� and it is not allowed to make an unsigncrypt query on (J* with sender I D § and receiver I D� unless the public key pk ID; of the sender or that of the receiver pk I D � has been replaced after the challenge was issued.
Eventually, AI outputs a bit {3' and wins the game if {3={3'. AI's advantage is defined as Adv�� D -CCA 2 -
Game IND-CCA2-II. This is the second game where C interacts with adversary An as follows:
Initialization: C runs the algorithm Setup on input a security parameter k to generate master-key and params, and sends master-key and para ms to An. Note that the security models described above deals with insider security since the adversary is assumed to have access to the private key of the sender of ciphertext 0'*. This means that the confidentiality is preserved even if a sender's private key is compromised. 
B. Unforgeability Model for Certificateless Signcryption
The authenticity property (existential unforgeability against chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA» for certificateless sign cryption schemes is captured by the following two games against AI and AI I, respectively.
Game EUF-CMA-I. This is the game where AI interacts with its Challenger C as follows:
Initialization: C runs the algorithm Setup on input a security parameter k to generate master-key and params, and sends params to AI.
Queries: The adversary AI performs a polynomially bounded number of queries adaptively as in Game IND CCA2-I game.
Output: Finally, AI produces a new triple (IDs, IDR'O'*) (i.e. a triple that was not produced by the signcryption or acle) where the partial private key and the private key of IDs was not extract and wins the game if the result of Unsigncrypt(IDs, pkID ; , skiD ;" 0'*) is not the � symbol.
The adversary AI's advantage is its probability of victory.
Game EUF-CMA-II. This is the game where An interacts with its Challenger C as follow:
Initialization: C runs the algorithm Setup on input a security parameter k to generate master-key and params, and sends params and master-key to AI.
Queries: The adversary AI I performs a polynomially bounded number of queries adaptively as in Game IND CCA2-II game.
Output: Finally, AI produces a new triple (IDs, IDR'O'*) (i.e. a triple that was not produced by the signcryption oracle) where the private key of IDs was not extract and wins the game if the result of Unsigncrypt(IDs, pkID � ' skiD ;" 0'*) is not the � symbol.
The adversary AI I'S advantage is its probability of victory.
Note that this definition allows the adversary have access to the secret key of the receiver of the forgery, which guarantees the insider security.
Definition 6 (UF-CMA). An CLSC scheme is said to be EUF-CMA secure if no polynomially bounded adversary A E {AI, An} has a non-negligible advantage wins the games described above(Game EUF-CMA-I, Game EUF-CMA-II).
IV. NEW EFFICIENT CLSC SCHEME
In this section, we propose a new efficient CLSC scheme which consists of the following seven algorithms.
Setup: Given a security parameter k, the algorithm works as follows:
Outputs descriptions of bilinear map groups (G1, G 2, GT) of same prime order p > 2 k . Chooses an arbitrary generator Q of G2 and sets P = 'l/J (Q) E G1 and g = e(P, Q) E GT. Randomly picks s E Z; and sets Pp u b = sQ as, respectively, master-key and system public key.
Selects three distinct cryptographic hash functions H 1 : {O,l}* --t Z;, H 2 : {O,l} n x G 2 X GT X G� --t Z; and H 3 : GT x G 2 --t {O, l} n where n is the length of message to be signcrypted.
The system parameters are params = < G1,G 2, GT,e,p, P, Q, g, Pp u b, 'l/J, H1, H2, H 3 > and publishes params. Set-Public-Key: Given params, a user's identity ID and the secret value x I D, this algorithm computes his public key pkID = XID(Pp u b + H1(ID )Q).
Set-Private-Key: Given params, the user's partial private key dID and his secret value XID E Z;, and output a pair (dID,XID) as the user's private key SkID.
Signcrypt(skID" lOR, pklD" , m) : To send a message m E {O, l} n to the receiver with identity I DR and public key pkIDc" the sender with private key SkID s works as follow:
Randomly picks r l E R Z; and computes u = r l (Ppub + HI (IDJIlJQ) and c = m EEl H 3( gT l, r l pkID:J. Computes h 2 = H 2( m, u, gT l, r l pkIDIR, pkID"pkIDIR) ' v = T l+ h2dID, and w = XID,h2 +r l . r l ,. Under the q-BDHI assumption and CDH assump tion, the proposed CLSC scheme is IND-CCA2 secure in the random oracle model [7] .
This theorem follows from Lemmas I and 2.
Lemma 1. Assume that an IND-CCA2-1 adversary AI has non-negligible advantage E against our scheme when running in time 7, asking q i queries to random oracles Hi (i = 1,2,3 ) , q pp k partial private key queries, qsk private key queries, q p k public key requests, q p k T public key replacement queries, qs signcryption queries and qun unsigncryption queries. Then there is an algorithm C to solve the q-BDHIP for q = ql + 1 with probability E'> E (1 _ q 2q2 +q 3 + 2qs )( 1 _qun ) -ql(q2 +q 3+ qs) s 2 k 2 k within a time 7' < 7 + [3ql + q pk + 4qs + 3qu (q2 + qs)] 7 m ult + qu(q2 + qs)7ex p + [2q2qs + 2q3qs + qs + 3qu (q2 + qs)]7 p where 7 mult denotes the time for computing multiplication in 1G1 or 1G 2 , 7exp denotes the time for computing exponentiation in IGT and 7p is the time for pairing computation.
Proof. Proof. See full version of the paper [20] . Lemma 2. Assume that an IND-CCA2-II adversary AI! has non-negligible advantage E against our scheme when running in time 7, asking q i queries to random oracles Hi (i = 1,2,3 ) , qsk private key queries, q p k public key requests, qs signcryption queries and qun unsigncryption queries. Then there is an algorithm C to solve the CDHP with probability Proof. See full version of the paper [20] .
Theorem 2. Under the q-SDH assumption and DL assumption, the proposed CLSC scheme is EUF-CMA secure in the random oracle model [7] .
This theorem follows from Lemmas 3 and 4.
Lemma 3. Assume that there exists an EUF-CMA-I adversary AI that makes q i queries to random oracles Hi (i = 1,2,3 ) , q pp k partial key queries, qsk private key queries, q p k public key requests, q p k T public key replacement queries, qs signcryption queries and qun unsigncryption queries. Assume also that, within a time 7, AI produces a forgery with probability E � lO( qs + 1 )(qs + q2)/2 k . Then, there is an algorithm C to solve the q-SDHP for q = ql + 1 with probability
in expected time 7' 'S 23q2 [7 + (qpk + 4qs + 3qu (q2 + qs))7mult + qu(q2 + qs)7ex p + (2q2qs + 2q3qs + qs + 3qu(q2 + qs))7 p ][ E(1 -qu/2 k )( 1 -q s(q2 + q3 + qs)/2 k )] -1 + 3q17mult where 7 mult , 7exp and 7p denote the same quantities as in
Proof. See full version of the paper [20] .
Lemma 4. Assume that there exists an EUF-CMA-II adversary AI! that makes q i queries to random oracles Hi (i = 1,2,3 ) , qsk private key queries, q p k public key requests, qs signcryp tion queries and qun unsigncryption queries. Assume also that, within a time 7, AI! produces a forgery with probability E � lO( qs + 1 )(qs + q2)/2 k . Then, there is an algorithm C to solve the DLP with probability
in expected time 7' 'S 23q2 [7 + (qpk + qsk + 5qs + 2qu (q2 + qs))7mult + qu(q2 + qs)7ex p + (qs + 7qu(q2 + qs))7 p ][ E(1 -qu/2 k )(1 -qs(q2 +q3 +qs)/2 k )] -1 + Tmult where 7mult, Texp and Tp denote the same quantities as in Lemma 1 Proof. See full version of the paper [20] .
B. Efficiency
There are almost three CLSC schemes in the literature [2] , [14] and [19] . We now compare our CLSC scheme with the scheme proposed in [2] , [14] and [19] According to the result in [4, 6] , the pairing operation is several times more expensive than the multiplication in G1 and G 2 and exponentiation in GT. Hence reducing the number of pairing operations is critical. As shown in Table 1 , our CLSC scheme only requires two pairing operations in sign crypt and unsigncrypt phases. Above all, our scheme is more efficient than all the schemes available.
VI. CONCLUSION
Certificateless public key cryptography is receiving signifi cant attention because it is a new paradigm that simplifies the traditional PKC and solves the inherent key escrow problem suffered by ID-PKC. Certificateless signcryption is one of the most important security primitives in CL-PKC. In this paper, we proposed a new efficient certificateless signcryption scheme based on bilinear pairing, which requires only two pairing operations in the signcrypt and unsigncrypt phases. The security of our scheme is based on the hardness assumptions of DLP, CDHP, q-SDHP and q-BDHIP.
